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ABSTRACT 
The absence of a formidable U.S. and allied Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capability in 
the East Asian region has encouraged a build-up in offensive missile capability on the 
part of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK). This build-up has destabilized a region of vital importance to the 
national interest of the United States by encouraging the idea that offensive military 
action can be utilized to attain national ambitions at a relatively acceptable cost. This 
thesis shows that the introduction of a layered missile defense capability will serve to 
enhance regional security for the United States and its allies by raising the costs 
associated with using missiles in an offensive manner and by underscoring the level of 
commitment the United States maintains in guaranteeing the security of its allies in the 
face of a growing regional threat. The political benefits associated with such a tangible 
defensive obligation on the part of the United States should not be underrated. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Northeast Asia has witnessed a build-up of offensive missile capability by the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). This thesis examines the security ramifications of extending U.S. theater 
missile defenses (TMD) to the region and assesses the implications of such a deployment 
for the foreign policies of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and 
North Korea. How should the United States respond to the growing threat posed to its 
national interests and those of its friends and allies by the unsettling dilemma of 
widespread missile proliferation? What are the consequences going to be if the United 
States fails to counter this real and growing threat? 
To answer these questions, this thesis will explore how ballistic missiles emerged 
into the prominent strategic position they occupy in Beijing and Pyongyang today. The 
U.S. TMD effort to date and the likely way these systems will be employed in the future 
will be described. The relevance of offense-defense theory in the TMD debate will be 
explored. Also, current U.S. TMD doctrine will be identified to determine if it balances 
an offense-defense approach to TMD. Finally, an in-depth assessment will be provided 
of the impact of TMD on the countries in the region. 
If the United States fails to undertake a determined effort to deploy TMD systems 
and to convince its allies that these defensive systems are necessary, then the future 
stability of the region becomes highly uncertain 
For the United States, the ability to stay engaged and relevant in Northeast Asia 
hinges on its capacity to introduce TMD to the region.  Since the area currently lacks a 
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system of multilateral institutions and confidence building measures, the United States 
must reformulate its role in the region to fit the new realities that have emerged in 
Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. 
For China, the consequences of a U.S. TMD umbrella, especially over Taiwan, 
are serious. A TMD capability that offers at least some degree of protection for U.S. 
forces, and the allies who offer host nation support to those forces, will serve to diminish 
the level of regional coercion that the PRC could bring to bear in any future crisis. A 
TMD capability extended to Taiwan would be grave enough that some intricate and 
possibly grievous decisions would literally be forced upon the leadership in Beijing. 
However, the question of TMD coverage over Taiwan must be interspersed with 
all issues faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Faced with a diminishing 
consent to rule since 1989, the CCP has sought to fortify its waning legitimacy by making 
its priority number one the continuation of economic modernization and growth, started 
in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, followed by an increasing emphasis on fostering a 
rising sense of nationalism within Chinese society, of which Taiwan is a clear 
manifestation. This is the context that must be taken into consideration when discussing 
whether or not to extend TMD to Taiwan. 
Since the arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles in the inventory of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) continues to multiply at an alarming pace, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the lack of an effective counter to these weapons has convinced some 
influential elements within the Chinese leadership that Taiwan can be coerced back into 
the fold of Chinese unity quickly and cheap. 
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By injecting TMD into this strategic calculation, the United States can stabilize 
the security dilemma across the Taiwan Straits by introducing a defensive system that 
will be able to at least partially mitigate the threat posed by these weapons. 
By upping the stakes of military conquest, the United States will essentially force 
the CCP to choose which path it will follow in Northeast Asia. Since the standard and 
authoritative position in Beijing has always been since the late 1970s that economic 
development is and will remain the number one priority of the party, it is realistic to 
assume that this will continue to be the choice over other competing priorities. If raising 
the perceived costs of such a conquest diminishes the prospect of reunifying Taiwan with 
the mainland through force, then a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue may be 
achieved at some point in the future. 
If the choice is to still resort to war to settle the Taiwan issue, even in the face of 
TMD, then the CCP will run the dual risk of foisting economic collapse upon China 
along with the very real prospect of being irretrievably disgraced on the battlefield. Such 
dreadful possibilities, partially enabled by TMD, may be just what it takes to keep the 
peace in Northeast Asia for the foreseeable future. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
One of the enduring legacies of the Cold War has been the recurring debate about 
the various incarnations of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Missile defense 
technology first emerged in the 1960s with the Sentinel and Safeguard programs. As 
offensive technology has progressed, new threats have emerged. Debate about whether or 
not missile defenses should be developed or abandoned continues. 
The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technologies throughout the world 
has added a new twist to the question of whether or not missile defense systems should be 
developed. The quantitative and qualitative expansion of the missile programs of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK, also referred to as North Korea), coupled with the willingness of these two 
governments to export this technology to unstable areas of the globe, has initiated a 
heightened level of vigilance on the part of the United States and its allies as to the 
destabilizing impact this phenomenon has on the security environment of regions of the 
world which are critical to maintaining international peace and prosperity. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should the United States respond to the growing threat posed to its national 
interests, and those of its friends and allies, by widespread missile proliferation? The 
case study used to illustrate the problem will be confined geographically to Northeast 
Asia — namely China, the Korean peninsula, Japan, and Taiwan. Also, when discussing 
missile defense systems as a response to the missile development programs of the PRC 
1 
and the DPRK, the focus will be on those systems capable of Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD), meaning systems that, for the most part, do not have the capability to intercept 
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Table 1 provides a classification of 
ballistic missiles by range: 
Table 1. Classification of Ballistic Missiles by Range 
CLASSIFICATION RANGE 
Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) Under 1,000 km 
Medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) 
1,000 to 3,000 km 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) 
3,000 to 5,500 km 
Intercontinental-range ballistic missile 
(ICBM) 
Over 5,500 km 
From: National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States Througi 2015. September 1999. 
While the issue of United States National Missile Defense (NMD) has significant 
implications for the PRC and its ability to maintain a credible strategic deterrent, it will 
not be included in this work. Keeping TMD and NMD separate makes sense because they 
are each designed to counter threats posed at different levels along the ladder of crisis and 
conflict escalation. Furthermore, conventional or even nuclear-equipped theater missiles 
are intended to serve a far different purpose than nuclear-tipped ICBMs because that they 
are envisioned to be usable on the battlefield without necessarily provoking a response 
from an adversary that jeopardizes national survival. Theater missiles are imagined to be 
a viable weapon a military commander can use regardless of whatever level of conflict in 
which he may find himself involved. This fact alone makes their use in future disputes 
highly probable, bringing with it a set of considerations far different and more complex 
than those brought about by the existence of strategic ballistic missiles and the theories 
surrounding their use or non-use in international conflict. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the TMD debate by first emphasizing the guiding concepts 
behind the PRC and DPRK missile programs and how these ideas have been shaped by 
the perceived security circumstances and outlook of the political leadership in each 
country. Second, a brief summary of U.S. TMD programs is described. Finally, the 
security needs of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea and their relations with the United 
States will be described to validate a future TMD deployment to the region. 
The research will draw primarily from the scholarly work of various experts on 
East Asia. However, some primary documents, such as US government publications also 
will be used as a way of explaining why TMD in the region should be pursued. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The following chapter will analyze the rise of the Chinese missile program and 
explain how the country's experiences have shaped its missile development. A heavy 
influence will be placed on the various formulations of deterrence theory that have 
emerged in China since the country detonated its first nuclear weapon in October of 
1964. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the expanding Chinese missile capabilities 
and their attempts at proliferating these weapons abroad will be put forth as a way of 
underscoring the heightening sense of insecurity that has begun to permeate the region. 
Chapter III will explain how the North Korean missile program has magnified the 
sense of looming threat that now pervades much of Asia. The motivations for the North 
Korean program seem to emanate from a completely different set of goals than those of 
China.    This chapter also will describe how the North Korean leadership views its 
security situation in the post-Cold War era. 
Chapter IV will summarize the U.S. effort to develop and deploy TMD systems. 
This section will look at four programs that have been developed and are now undergoing 
rigorous testing. Three other programs that will be discussed are based around laser 
technology, but they are many years away from becoming operational. The concept of 
laser-based missile defense, however, is a radical departure from the standard assessment 
that missiles offer the optimal means of intercepting another missile in flight. 
Chapter V describes the balance between offensive and defensive methods. Two 
examples will be used to illustrate how an over-reliance on offensive measures can lead 
to disastrous consequences. The British experience in countering German U-boats during 
the World Wars and the American experience with counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia 
in the 1960's relate to questions about how to counter theater missiles. This chapter then 
wraps up with an overview of current U.S. TMD doctrine as promulgated by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and whether or not this doctrine reflects the need to balance offensive and 
defensive options in formulating a solution to the dilemma presented by these weapons. 
Chapter VI returns to Northeast Asia by examining what is at stake for the United 
States and its three major allies in the region: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The 
analysis will focus on how a U.S. TMD umbrella fits into the security calculus of each of 
these countries in light of the new and growing dangers in the region. Specifically, has 
the emerging threat of ballistic and cruise missiles in the region altered the perception for 
the worse that the United States can and will continue to be the guarantor of regional 
peace and stability, or will making the effort to extend TMD coverage to these three 
countries strengthen the position of the United States in this important area of the world? 
Chapter VII flips this last question around and examines the implications of a 
U.S. TMD umbrella on the national security outlook of both China and North Korea. 
Most importantly, how will a U.S. TMD deployment in the region impact the behavior of 
these two countries towards their neighbors? Will such a symbol of U.S. resolve serve to 
moderate their objectives and force them to adopt a more responsible posture in the 
region or will such a deployment only provide them with a sense that a window of 
opportunity to realize their national ambitions is being closed? 
E.       ASSUMPTIONS 
A number of assumptions have to be made regarding the subject material as many 
of the issue being debated here are either still conceptual and have yet to be actually 
applied in reality or they are disputable from a theoretical standpoint. 
First of all, it is assumed that the international relations theory of realism is the 
most applicable for the region of Northeast Asia today. Though there are various types of 
realism ranging from classical realism, which states that insecurity is a universal and 
permanent feature of the international order, due to the latter's abidingly anarchic 
character,1 to the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz, which rejects the "reductionist" theory 
of realism in favor of a "systemic" approach which disregards any domestic factors 
within a nation-state that may influence its international behavior in favor of the idea that 
the international system itself, be it bipolar or multipolar in nature, is wholly responsible 
1
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
5 
for the intrigues created when nation-states interact with one another.2 There is even a 
school of thought that makes the assertion that China has always practiced its own brand 
of "cultural realism" which is remarkably similar in appearance to the realism that 
emerged in the Western world following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.3 
No matter which version of realism one chooses to apply to East Asia, it is 
implicit from the behavior of states in the region that the dictates of realpolitik, or power 
politics, guide the decision-making process of national leaders across Northeast Asia. As 
evidence of this, it is only necessary to draw attention to the similarities of the Northeast 
Asian security pattern to the example provided by Europe during the decade previous to 
the outbreak of World War I, a time often considered to be the high water mark of 
realism. Like Wilhelmine Germany before it, the PRC is a late-blooming great power 
emerging into a world already ordered strategically by earlier rivals.4 Also, there exists 
an irretrievable grievance across the Taiwan Strait (similar to Alsace-Lorraine between 
Germany and France), an arms race that is beginning to gather momentum, and a 
strategic alliance between a powerful maritime nation (the United States) and another 
powerful, though weakened, state (Japan) that closely resembles the Anglo-Russian 
entente that developed against a Germany that was suddenly emboldened by the stunning 
and humiliating loss suffered by Czarist Russia at the hands of the Japanese during the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. 
2
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
3
 For further reading on this topic, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and 
Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Also, see Arthur 
Waldron's review of this book titled "The Art of Shi," The New Republic, 23 June 1997. 
4
 Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right," The National 
Interest, Winter 2000/2001, Issue no. 62. 
A second assumption is that the various TMD development programs currently 
underway in the United States and Japan will eventually result in the fielding of a 
plausible defense against at least an initial missile attack. Many critics of missile defense 
systems complain that it is technically impossible to detect, track, and intercept an 
incoming missile with another missile because the speeds involved are too great or that 
effective countermeasures will be too easy to develop and deploy. Technical hurdles do 
indeed exist, but it is difficult to support the idea that missile defense itself is impossible. 
Technical innovation has a long history of turning what was once believed to be 
hopelessly unachievable into the ordinary occurrences of daily life. Circumnavigating 
the globe, achieving powered flight, and routine space travel are all examples that 
underscore the point of the impossible becoming the possible. Clinging to the notion that 
missile defense is technically infeasible simply because it is a "pipe dream" starts to look 
like nothing more than the ranting of a shrieking Luddite. 
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II.     THE PRC - ASIA'S "MISSILE BULLY"s 
A.       DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRC MISSILE PROGRAM 
The impetus for the PRC to pursue the development of ballistic missiles was 
generated by events that occurred in the 1950s. But it is now propelled by a much more 
intricate set of motivations that reflect the altered strategic atmosphere of modern day 
Asia. 
On three separate occasions throughout the 1950s, the PRC found itself on the 
receiving end of implied nuclear threats from the United States. The first occurred as the 
Korean War dragged on in a bloody stalemate in 1953 and the newly elected Eisenhower 
administration came to power in Washington, partly on the promise that it would end the 
fighting on the Korean peninsula. While the threat was promulgated by the United 
States, it is not clear that this was the overarching reason that pushed the Chinese into 
agreement on an armistice, as the timing virtually coincided with the death of Stalin in 
the Soviet Union in March 1953. Which event more influenced the Chinese to break the 
deadlock at the negotiating table is still a matter of debate.6 
The second time the PRC was threatened with U.S. nuclear weapons was during 
the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which was set in motion by the negotiations that led to 
the signing of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty. As a way of testing the resolve of the 
United States, Mao Zedong ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to begin 
shelling a number of islands close to the Chinese mainland that were occupied by 
5 The author first heard this term used by Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, USN, (Ret.), during a lecture 
presented at the Naval Postgraduate School in October, 2000. 
6
 Denny Roy, China's Foreign Relations (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1998). 
Taiwanese forces. Tension continued to escalate through March 1955, when both 
President Eisenhower and Vice-President Richard Nixon publicly suggested the United 
States might use nuclear weapons against China in connection with the Straits crisis.7 
A third instance of such threats occurred during the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis 
which resulted in the deployment of several U.S. aircraft carriers armed with nuclear- 
capable aircraft along with numerous escort ships. By that time, however, the first two 
occasions had been enough to convince Chinese leaders and their allies in Moscow that 
the PRC required its own nuclear capability and delivery system to avoid being subjected 
to future U.S. nuclear threats. Development of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles 
proceeded concurrently, and both programs enjoyed continuously disproportionate shares 
of the PRC defense budget throughout the Mao years and beyond, even during times 
when the country was suffering famine and intense domestic political turmoil. 
On September 13, 1956, Moscow agreed to sell the PRC two R-l missiles (these 
missiles were essentially copies of the German V-2) and relevant technical documents.8 
The Chinese gained little useful knowledge from this primitive missile, but its 
procurement was followed by the Chinese acquisition of its more sophisticated follow-on 
system. Under the Sino-Soviet New Defense Technical Accord signed on October 15, 
1957, a Soviet Army missile battalion with two R-2 missiles and their associated 
launching equipment reached Beijing on December 24. This date marked the real 
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What emerged out of these initial technology transfers was to become known as 
the Dongfeng (DF or East Wind) indigenous development program within the PRC. By 
1960, the need for self-reliance was forced upon the Chinese as the Sino-Soviet split 
intensified, making further military cooperation impossible. The PLA's missile designers 
quickly understood that they were on their own.10 
However, Chinese scientists who had trained in the Soviet Union during the 
1950s had gathered enough information about Soviet missile systems to carry on their 
own effort to develop ballistic missiles without further assistance. 
After the first successful Chinese atomic bomb test on October 16, 1964, the need 
to finish working out the remaining technical difficulties became pressing as China's 
strategic environment began to deteriorate rapidly. The year 1965 saw the start of the 
huge Soviet military build-up along China's northern border and the rapid escalation of 
U.S. military intervention in Vietnam along China's southern border. This simultaneous 
encroachment along China's borders by the world's two superpowers, both now overtly 
hostile to the PRC, was deeply troublesome to the leadership in Beijing as it had no 
meaningful allies to turn to for help. 
Fortuitously for the PRC, on October 27 1966, the missile crews at the 
Shuangchengzi test base in Gansu Province launched a DF-2A (design range of 1250km 







Over the next 15 years, Chinese scientists were guided by nothing more than the 
technical requirements generated by the need to strike targets further away from China as 
a way of enhancing the deterrent potential of the PRC's limited number of nuclear 
warheads. In sequence, these missiles were designated the DF-2 (targeted on U.S. bases 
in Japan), DF-3 (the Philippines), DF-4 (Guam), and the DF-5 (continental United 
States).12 
B.       EVOLVING FROM "MINIMUM" TO "LIMITED" DETERRENCE 
With the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the PRC's strategic outlook 
began to change drastically. By the mid-1980s, the notion that the PLA would have to 
project power along the vast periphery of China in order to defend Chinese interests came 
to dominate the once sacred strategy of "People's War." This Maoist vision, which 
emphasized the need to "lure the enemy in deep" to weaken and ultimately defeat an 
anticipated Soviet invasion, was no longer considered necessary in light of the 
diminishing power of the Soviet Union. This new strategy, initially referred to as 
"people's war under modern conditions," altered the direction of the Chinese ballistic 
missile program in two significant ways. 
First, there has been a distinctive shift away from what had been a consistent 
emphasis in China on maintaining a small and relatively inaccurate nuclear arsenal as a 
means of launching a retaliatory second-strike against any nation that first attacked China 
with nuclear weapons. Reliance upon such a strategy is what Western scholars refer to as 
"minimal deterrence," which essentially relies on countervalue targeting of a few enemy 




officials never openly professed any nuclear strategy other than that of no-first use, 
(NFU), it is plausible that the PRC was forced into adopting a minimal deterrence posture 
in the 1960s due to its lack of resources. The country could barely afford a handful of 
nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles with which to deliver them and what it did acquire 
came at a steep price in terms of the overall economy. 
By the mid-1980s, the idea that China still had a credible deterrent against the 
superpowers was called into question. The enhanced reconnaissance capabilities and the 
improved accuracy of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals alerted Beijing to the reality 
that China was again becoming dangerously exposed to possible nuclear coercion. It 
became accepted that minimum deterrence capabilities are in practice too vulnerable to a 
disarming first strike, and thus have little deterrent value.13 
The new approach the Chinese adopted is what has come to be known as "limited 
deterrence." This concept, much more intricate in detail and far more complex in 
requirements than minimal deterrence, emphasizes operational flexibility and maintaining 
a war-fighting potential against a technologically superior adversary. As Alastair Iain 
Johnston writes: 
A limited deterrent means having enough capabilities to deter 
conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and 
suppress escalation during a nuclear war. That is, a limited deterrent 
should be able to respond to any level or type of attack from tactical to 
strategic, and the initial response should be calibrated to the scope of the 
initial attack.14 
13
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With this change, the focus of Chinese nuclear deterrence has shifted more to 
what strategists call "counterforce" targeting, which entails the ability to strike at an 
enemy's military assets or logistical bases before attacks can be unleashed against China 
during a conflict. While the large warheads situated atop the Chinese ICBM force would 
still play a countervalue role in the event of an all-out nuclear attack upon Chinese 
territory, the need to develop smaller, more accurate warheads and a more diverse means 
of delivering them became priority development items for the PRC leadership. 
As a result of this new stance, the Chinese missile program assumed a high profile 
role in meeting the demands placed on the PLA, primarily due to the fact that the 
military-industrial complex within China could offer little else in the way of bridging the 
gap between PRC ambitions and PLA capabilities. As opposed to manned long-range 
aircraft, submarines, or surface naval vessels, missiles are relatively cheap, comparatively 
simple, and potentially very effective.15 The ability of Chinese industry to produce a 
variety of missiles in large numbers also is more than likely the result of this sector 
enjoying disproportionate levels of resources over time. The accumulated knowledge and 
experience that has logically developed within this industry is now paying large 
dividends to China as it races to build-up and modernize the PLA. 
A key feature in the expansion of Chinese missile capabilities has been the move 
away from reliance on liquid-fueled missiles, which require several hours to prepare for 
launch once ordered, to solid-fueled missiles which are smaller, can be made mobile by 
using transporter-erector-launcher's (TELs), and can be launched far more rapidly. 
However, shifting to solid fuels required China to develop smaller, lighter warheads with 
15
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much better yield-to-weight ratios than its older weapons because solid fuel contains less 
thrust than liquid fuel.16 Table 2 encapsulates the progression of Chinese ballistic 
missiles from the 1960s to the present day. 
Table 2. Chinese Ballistic Missiles 
Designator Range (km) Payload (kg) Fuel Type Use 
DF-2A 1250 1500 Liquid Strategic 
DF-3A 2800 2150 Liquid Strategic 
DF-4 4750 2200 Liquid Strategic 
DF-5A 13,000 3200 Liquid Strategic 
DF-21A 1800 600 Solid Strategic 
DF-25 1700 2000 Solid Strategic 
DF-31 8000 700 Solid Strategic 
DF-15/M-9 600 500 Solid Tactical 
DF-ll/M-11 300 500 Solid Tactical 
From: Derived From Lewis and Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," p. 9-11. 
Another interesting facet of recent Chinese ballistic missile developments has 
been the Chinese high command raising its assessment of battlefield tactical ballistic 
missiles (TBMs) as a supplement to the PLA's inadequate strike aircraft.17 While these 
new weapons first emerged from attempts by Chinese industry to take advantage of the 
lucrative export market for TBMs (discussed in more detail below), PLA strategists were 
16
 Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment," Current History, September 1999. 
17
 Lewis and Di, China's Ballistic Missile Programs. 
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quick to recognize the utility that such assets could provide them in any number of 
potential conflicts that required the PLA to extend fire-support outside the borders of the 
PRC. The DF-11 and DF-15 are both short-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering 
a wide variety of conventional warheads or even a single tactical nuclear warhead. 
C.       MISSILE EXPORTS: REVENUE AND GEOPOLITICS 
The second major change in the Chinese ballistic missile program brought about 
by Deng's revision of the PRC's strategic outlook was his encouragement of the export 
of missiles as a viable means of raising hard currency to subsidize an insufficient PLA 
budget. The reform efforts set in motion by Deng established as the overriding priority of 
the Chinese leadership the development and modernization of the Chinese economy at 
the expense of the military. This emphasis rested on the assumption that the surplus 
resources generated by a market-oriented economy would eventually provide the 
wherewithal to modernize the PLA, whose conventional technology and doctrine had 
been stagnant since the mid-1960s. ■*&* 
The insatiable appetite for weapons created by the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s 
provided a convenient opportunity for the Chinese to begin marketing their hardware, 
which they offered to both sides participating in the conflict. Witnessing the Iraqis 
barrage Tehran with Soviet-made SCUD missiles during the latter stages of the war, the 
Chinese were impressed by the effectiveness of conventional ballistic missiles in 
substituting for a lack of adequate strike aircraft in a conflict. The Chinese also paid 
close attention to the considerable profits realized by the Soviets, who were supplying the 
Iraqis with as many short-range missiles as their oil-based economy could afford. 
16 
Attempts by the Chinese to sell the Iranians missiles to counter the Iraqi SCUDs 
fell apart as a satisfactory method of payment could not be agreed upon.18 Yet, by 1988, 
the PRC was able to negotiate a deal with Saudi Arabia whereby the Chinese would 
provide the Saudis with 30 outdated DF-3 IRBMs, though no nuclear warheads were 
included in the agreement. 
-"•ö1 
By 1984, engineers in the First Academy (responsible for surface-to-surface 
missile research and development) concluded that they could easily and cheaply adapt the 
technologies from China's second-generation strategic missiles to a new class of short- 
range tactical ballistic missiles.19 Upon receiving approval for the concept from the 
space ministry, First Academy scientists began an accelerated effort to generate a missile 
that would be superior in range and accuracy compared to the Soviet SCUD's that were 
filling this niche in the global arms market. The resulting 600km-range DF-15 missile, 
known by its export designation M-9, was showcased at the first Asian Defense 
Exhibition (ASIANDEX) in Beijing in 1986. This new weapon attracted not only the 
attention of foreign buyers, but also that of the PLA's Secondary Artillery, which 
maintains all of the PRC's rocket forces and operates in a similar fashion to the former 
Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. High-level officers within the Secondary Artillery were 
quick to realize just how much flexibility these missiles offered to the evolving war- 
fighting doctrines of the PLA and immediately moved to add it to their own inventory, 






production two years after the M-9/DF-15 and was given the designator DF-11 by the 
Secondary Artillery. 
Foreign buyers for these new, more capable conventional missiles were quick to 
conclude deals with Beijing. The Syrians paid a deposit for future delivery of a number 
of M-9s in 1988, and it is believed that the Chinese sold the M-l 1 to Pakistan as early as 
1991.20 Even in light of this apparent eagerness to sell missiles to anyone willing to pay 
for them, China has emerged as a calculating, strategic proliferator.21 The PRC sells its 
tactical missiles to countries that are either located far away from its own borders to 
ensure that these weapons will not one day be used against the PRC or to countries that 
conveniently act as a counter to another strategic rival, such as is the case with Pakistan 
vis-ä-vis India. China's rumored cooperation on nuclear and missile technology transfers 
with Iran also have aided the PRC's efforts to build an additional power center in a region 
that currently preoccupies the United States, probably in the hope that continued 
instability in the Persian Gulf region will stretch out the military might of the world's 
only superpower. In Beijing's strategic calculations, faced with two regional crises 
simultaneously, the USA would have to select which one is more important for its 
national security interests, leaving the other to China to sort out.22 
China, a country that was once subjected to nuclear bullying, has now expanded 
its missile capability and embedded it so deeply into the PLA's doctrinal thinking that it 
has now assumed a bullying role in East Asia.  Such developments even inspired former 
20 Ibid. 
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President Richard Nixon to wonder if his opening of the PRC in the early 1970s might 
have actually created "a Frankenstein."23 
Many of the PRC's neighbors, along with the United States, have begun reacting 
to this turn of events by beefing up their own military capabilities, a process that could 
eventually see the PLA falling even further behind wealthier and more technologically 
advanced countries such as Japan and Taiwan. Even India, which is not as developed 
economically or militarily as China, was motivated to join the group of declared nuclear 
states in 1998, primarily as a result of its regional rivalry with Pakistan, but also by the 
threat of Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons. These warning signs point to an 
ominous future in this critical area of the world if the status quo powers in the region do 
not react to the continuing missile build-up in the correct manner. 
" Quoted in Joseph A. Bosco, "Has China Turned Into A Frankenstein?" Los Angeles Times, 
05 March 2001. 
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III.    CALCULATED IRRATIONALITY - THE NORTH KOREAN 
MISSILE PROGRAM 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The first known instance of North Korea expressing a desire to obtain a ballistic 
missile capability came in April 1975, when North Korean Defense Minister Oh Jin-U, 
accompanying Kim H-Sung during his visit to Beijing, inquired whether China could 
equip his forces with 600km missiles.24 While China had no such weapon in its 
inventory at the time, the request coincided with China's growing interest in the possible 
use of tactical ballistic missiles on the battlefield. This mutual interest led to an 
agreement between the Chinese and the North Koreans in late 1976 for the joint 
development of the Chinese-designated DF-61 single-stage mobile tactical missile, which 
would carry cluster munitions or fuel-air explosive warheads.25 This program collapsed, 
however, when its primary Chinese supporter, Chen Xilian, was ousted from office in 
1978.26 While this effort did not result in North Korea obtaining a missile system, it did 
provide North Korean technicians and scientists who worked on the project valuable 
knowledge on missile design that proved to be crucial within a few short years.27 
Following their unsuccessful attempt at cooperating on missile development with 
the PRC, the North Koreans began to look for anyone who was willing to provide 
assistance.   In 1981, they were able to purchase Soviet-made SCUD-B SRBMs from 
24
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 Peter Saracino (ed.), "North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program," Center for Nonproliferation 
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26
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Egypt, reverse-engineer the missile, and then develop subsequent versions, which 
allowed it to gain expertise in the production and testing of missiles.28 Table 3 classifies 
successful North Korean missile developments to date. 
Table 3. North Korean Ballistic Missiles 
SPECIFICATION TYPE RANGE (km) 
SCUD-B SRBM 300 
SCUD-C SRBM 550 
NODONG MRBM 1300 
TAEPODONG-1 MRBM 2000 
TAEPODONG-2 ICBM 6000 
From: "North Korea's Missile Capability," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 2001. 
By 1983, Iran also began playing a significant role in the North Korean missile 
program by acting as the primary financial supporter in exchange for the option to 
purchase production models.29 A particular attraction of having the Iranians assume this 
role is that they were capable of paying the North Koreans with a highly-desired and 
much needed commodity: oil. Moreover, the potential use of Iranian test-sites for North 
Korean missiles has not gone unnoticed in recent years. The Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic 






 Bill Gertz, "Iran Set for Another Flight Test of Missile," The Washington Times, 
08 September 2000. 
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Iranians from their test launches not only provides the North Koreans with an opportunity 
to improve their own designs and components, but also allows the Iranians access to any 
technical improvements made by North Korean scientists. 
The most recent milestone in the North Korean missile program was achieved on 
31 August 1998, when the first flight test of the two-stage Taepodong-1 occurred. The 
missile flew due east across the Sea of Japan. The first stage separated 300km east of the 
launch site. The second stage continued over the main Japanese island of Honshu, and 
impacted in the Pacific Ocean 330km east of the Japanese port city of Hachinohe, after 
flying approximately 1380km.31 
This single event underscored the threat posed to Japan and its neighbors by the 
existence of North Korean ballistic missiles. While North Korea claimed that this launch 
was an attempt to place its first satellite into orbit, the message sent was unmistakable. 
This tiny, isolated country, suffering from severe material deprivations since the end of 
the Cold War due to the loss of its Soviet benefactor, is still capable of producing 
weapons that terrify the countries that it perceives as posing a threat to its existence. 
Namely South Korea, Japan, and the United States. 
B.       MOTIVATIONS 
As is common with many developing countries, North Korea originally turned to 
missile forces to compensate for its air force's lack of a long-range strike capability.32 
The inability of the North Korean to strike at the rear staging areas of Pusan and U.S. 
bases in Japan proved to be nearly fatal for the Pyongyang regime during the 1950-53 
31
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Korean War, and this lesson was not lost on North Korean leaders. However, for much 
of the time since the war ended in an armistice, North Korea was mainly dependent upon 
the generosity of the Soviet Union and, to an extent, China for its armaments. Therefore, 
the country could do little on its own to advance the technological sophistication of its 
weapons unless its major power benefactors agreed to provide the necessary material and 
operating expertise. 
During the brief period of cooperation with China on ballistic missile 
development in the 1970s, the North Koreans were able to obtain enough working 
knowledge of missiles from the Chinese to reverse-engineer the Egyptian SCUD-B and 
produce much-improved follow-on versions of this missile. This well-timed success 
provided the North Korean leadership with a unique opportunity at the end of the Cold 
War to use these weapons as a means to both extract monetary and security concessions 
from the West as a way of compensating for the loss of Soviet and Chinese aid. It also 
provided a way of generating hard currency for its struggling economy through the sale 
of these weapons to countries that were willing to pay the price to acquire them. The 
ongoing attempts by North Korea to develop a nuclear warhead and its advanced efforts 
at producing chemical and biological weapons also give the country a significant 
deterrent capability. 
One Western perception of the North Korean missile program has been based on 
the assumption that such missiles are simply too dangerous in the hands of a country with 
such a long history of committing acts of irrational violence. Rather than as an irrational 
state, however, North Korea is better understood as an alienated state. Pyongyang does 
24 
not abide by the rules of the system because it has no stake or place in the present 
international order.33 
The many instances of confrontational behavior exhibited by North Korea, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, need to be put in proper context by Western 
strategists. Since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has lost most of the political and economic 
support of its two former sponsors, Russia and China, while the U.S. remains Seoul's 
closest ally, permanently basing its military forces in South Korea.34 This deep-seated 
sense of insecurity makes the asymmetric deterrent provided by ballistic missiles all the 
more attractive as the North Korean military is so far behind the militaries of the United 
States and South Korea in terms of technology and doctrine that there is little chance it 
can succeed on the battlefield for any significant length of time if the country ever finds 
itself at war. 
Japan also occupies a position of considerable weight in the North Korean 
strategic calculus. The Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula following the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1895 lasted until the end of World War II and the memory of this 
time deeply impacts the collective psyche of the North Korean people and their 
leadership in Pyongyang. Government propaganda often emphasizes the fact that the 
Japanese were once the brutal oppressors of the Korean people. Because of the profound 
memories of being once subjugated by Japan, North Korea is seriously concerned that 
33




Japan might develop nuclear weapons and wants to retain the Nodong to maximize its 
leverage in dealing with Tokyo.35 
Brinksmanship has been the hallmark of North Korean foreign policy over much 
of the last decade and missile technology has been an integral part of this strategy. 
Fearful of settir   in motion any kind of reform that could possibly lead to the demise of 
the North Korean leadership, Pyongyang has relied on maintaining a threatening posture 
to the U.S. and its East Asian allies as a means of extorting aid needed to supplement the 
material shortcomings within its society that its economy is incapable of meeting. The 
1994 showdown over inspection of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility resulted in 
concessions by the U.S. to eventually provide two light-water reactors for production of 
electricity and up to 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet the needs of North 
Korean industry while the reactors are being built. It is suspected that the launch of the 
Taepodong missile that flew over Japan in 1998 may have been an expression of 
dissatisfaction by the North Koreans as to the slow pace of implementing the 1994 
nuclear agreement, as U.S. domestic politics have made it difficult to appropriate the 
required funding. 
Finally, fully assembled missiles or their component parts provide North Korea 
with one of the few items produced by its economy that is in worldwide demand and, 
therefore, offer the country one of the limited means it has at its disposal to generate 
desperately needed convertible revenue. This pressure to acquire hard currency shows no 
signs of abating as the North Korean economy remains in a steady condition of 
stagnation. 
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C.       TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES - A WORRISOME OUTLOOK 
Perhaps the most unsettling feature of the North Korean missile program has been 
the progression of missile technology that continually surprises analysts in the West. 
While it may seem reasonable that an impoverished and backward country like North 
Korea would lack enough innovation and resources to successfully achieve multiple stage 
missile systems or make the switch from liquid to solid propellant, that is exactly what 
scientists working on the North Korean missile program have been able to accomplish. 
Then again, it is worth mentioning that all significant North Korean missile 
development successes have been achieved with outside financing and/or technological 
assistance.36 Countries like Iran and Pakistan may be providing the financial assistance 
that is crucial to North Korea. But it is the importation of Russian missile specialists, 
many of whom are no longer able to find gainful employment in Russia's dwindling 
military-industrial complex, who are providing the enabling expertise for the accelerating 
advances in North Korean missile technology.37 
The most troublesome aspect of the developments in North Korea's missile 
program has to do with the extended ranges of each subsequent generation of North 
Korean missiles. According to David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, the 
Nodong's range marks the developmental limits of [single-stage] SCUD technology.38 
But it is the ability to launch a multiple-stage missile, as demonstrated by the Taepodong 
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launch in 1998 that has laid the groundwork for the destabilizing prospect of widespread 
ICBM proliferation throughout the world. 
Terminal velocity is the key performance parameter of a missile since it 
determines range. As George P. Sutton writes: 
Multi-stage rocket vehicles permit higher vehicle velocity and improved 
performance for long-range missiles. As the propellant is consumed in 
each stage, it is dropped from the vehicle, and the operation of the 
propulsion system of the next step is started. The last stage, which is 
usually the smallest, carries the useful load. The empty mass of the 
expended step or stage is separated from the useful remainder of the 
vehicle because it avoids expending the additional energy to accelerate it 
further. The start of the operation of the next rocket stage must be 
carefully timed [emphasis added].39 
It is this qualitative leap in technology, represented by successfully testing a 
multi-staged missile, that is opening the door for the North Korean missile program to 
become a global threat instead of the contained regional threat it had been up until 1998. 
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IV.    THE RESPONSE 
The United States has devoted significant resources over the past two decades 
towards developing theater missile defense systems capable of countering the threat 
posed by the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technology throughout the world. 
What has evolved out of this effort is a number of "upper-tier" and "lower-tier" systems 
that will ideally be fused together to form a "defense-in-depth" family of systems 
designed to work effectively against a multitude of missile threats.   Also, a number of 
laser-based systems designed to intercept hostile missiles in their "boost-phase" — before 
they have the ability to launch countermeasures or decoys — have been conceptualized 
and are in the early stages of development. The following is a brief description of TMD 
programs that are currently progressing through the testing and procurement pipeline or 
are already being fielded by U.S. and allied militaries around the world.40 
A.       UPPER-TIER TMD SYSTEMS 
1.        Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
THAAD is run by the Army and is designed to defend a limited geographic area, 
such as a battlefield. THAAD's primary purpose is to defend US troops in the field 
against the ballistic missile threat. It is a portable, ground-based system that will give 
U.S. forces the best chance to shoot down incoming missiles far enough out so that post- 
intercept debris will not harm our troops - a vital consideration if a missile carries a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD).41   THAAD is capable of intercepting targets both 
40
 For purposes of this thesis, TMD will encompass those systems designed to defend against both 
ballistic and cruise missiles. 
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within and outside the atmosphere and utilizes kinetic hit-to-kill technology instead of a 
fragmentation warhead to destroy its target. This system, however, has suffered a series 
of setbacks during its development that has necessitated the re-engineering of its missile 
component. The system will not be deployed until 2007 at the earliest. 
2.        Navy Theater Wide (NTW) 
NTW will utilize existing AEGIS technology and a modified Standard missile 
(SM-3) to provide an exoatmospheric TMD capability that will ideally intercept an 
incoming ballistic missile in its "ascent" phase. This capability to achieve ascent-phase 
intercept is considered the "holy grail of Naval TMD"42 as this early interception allows 
for multiple attempts at intercept and gives the added benefit of incinerating any WMD 
warheads as the intercept debris re-enters the atmosphere. 
This program has the advantage of tens of billions of dollars already spent 
procuring and decades of experience in utilizing the Aegis Weapons System (AWS) 
throughout the fleet. By expanding the capability of a system that is already operational 
and well understood, the US Navy should be able to assimilate the TMD mission 
relatively quickly once the acquisition phase of this program is reached by the end of the 
decade. NTW will offer exceptional missile defense coverage to islands or beachheads 
and multiple platforms could be linked together to safeguard the entire land-mass of an 
island nation. 
42
 CDR Charles Swicker, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense From The Sea, Newport Paper Number 
Fourteen, (Naval War College: Newport, RI, 1998). 
30 
B. LOWER-TIER TMD SYSTEMS 
1. Patriot (PAC-2/PAC-3) 
Patriot was originally developed as an advanced Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) 
weapon but evolved out of necessity into the US military's first TMD system, which 
made its combat debut during the Gulf War in 1991. It is now designed to be a last-ditch 
"point defense" weapon that protects only limited geographic areas such as airfields, port 
facilities, or military bases. It also can offer some protection to urban areas although its 
capabilities in this regard are limited. PAC-2 and PAC-3 are systems upgrades that have 
replaced the Gulf War version of the Patriot with the PAC-2 currently being fielded by 
the United States, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia, and Taiwan.43 PAC-3 is now in the final stages of development and is expected 
to be operational in 2001. 
2. Navy Area Wide (NAW) 
NAW will offer a point defense capability against enemy ballistic missiles and is 
designed for use in protecting ports, troop disembarkation points, and airfields. This 
program also builds upon the existing AEGIS infrastructure and utilizes an advanced 
Standard missile, the SM-2 Block IVA. Possible future uses for this weapons system 
could be with Japan for use on the Japanese AEGIS-equipped .Kongo-class destroyers or 
if the Bush administration ever decides to sell AEGIS ships to Taiwan. 
C. LASER SYSTEMS 
While high-energy lasers have been in existence for several decades, it has been 
only recently that successes in the miniaturization of laser and computer technology have 
43
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made it possible to envision the use of lasers in a TMD role. The problem in developing 
a workable laser weapon is not with the laser itself, but with the bulky, balky supporting 
systems: the chemical mixing modules to power it, the coolants to keep it from melting 
itself, and - above all - the computers to control, aim, and focus it.44 With significant 
progress being made in designing systems that can be installed on large aircraft, ships, or 
even satellites, the possibility of a revolution in the way missile defense is traditionally 
conceptualized could be underway. 
The drawback of anti-missile missiles is that they are roughly comparable in cost 
and speed to the incoming missile, so enemies can cost-effectively deluge any defense 
with more offense.45 In the face of repeated saturation attacks, any missile based TMD 
system will rapidly deplete its magazine(s), leaving commanders with the prospect of 
having to carry out their assigned mission without the ability to defend their troops, 
airfields, or logistical centers. 
1.        Airborne Laser (ABL) 
The ABL is an Air Force program that exploits the concept of Boost-Phase 
Intercept (BPI) by developing laser technology to the point where a powerful Chemical 
Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) will be mounted in the nose assembly of a Boeing 747 
freighter aircraft. This aircraft will then fly at high altitudes over friendly territory while 
searching for any indications of a ballistic missile launch. 
What BPI capability brings to the TMD effort is a quick, first-shot attempt at 
destroying an enemy ballistic missile shortly after it leaves its Transporter-Erector- 
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Launcher (TEL) when it is producing tremendous amounts of heat (thus, easily 
detectable), is moving relatively slowly, and has not had the opportunity to deploy any 
decoy warheads or other countermeasures. One additional benefit of BPI is that any 
ballistic missile carrying a WMD warhead would be destroyed over enemy territory, 
which would have a significant deterrent impact on any adversary. 
ABL Program Manager Col. Ellen Pawlikowski has stated that "ABL is on target 
and ready to go" for an initial test flight in 2002, a first attempt at a shoot down of a 
SCUD-type missile in 2003, and initial operational capability by 2007.46 
2.        Solid-State Laser (SSL) 
The decision to utilize an electric drive propulsion system onboard the Navy's 
next generation destroyer, the DD-21 Zumwalt-Class, has made it feasible to arm this 
ship with a weapon system designed around a Solid-State Laser, which is the system 
believed to be most suitable for operating at sea as the chemicals needed to operate the 
ABL's COIL laser present storage safety concerns for a ship.47 With traditional 
shipboard electrical plants unable to generate the power necessary to operate an SSL, the 
DD-21's electrical plant as currently envisioned could conceivably supply the energy to 
make an SSL a highly effective weapon against a missile threat. According to Rear 
Admiral Michael Mathis of the Naval Sea Systems Command, this weapon would offer 
the Navy, "speed of light delivery, short engagement time per target, low cost of 
engagement, deep magazine [and] covert engagement."48 
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3.        Space-Based Laser (SBL) 
The SBL is an Air Force program. It is a possible successor to ABL and was first 
envisioned as part of the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
during the 1980s and has seen many of the technical issues associated with it 
demonstrated as feasible.49 However, the high price tag associated with this system has 
been the major impediment towards its development during the reduced budget cycles of 
the 1990s. 
The major benefit of deploying a constellation of SBL satellites is that they would 
provide a BPI capability without prior knowledge of the launch site.50 Each satellite 
would carry an acquisition, tracking and pointing system using a low-power 
illuminator...and a high-energy läser, with a range of more than 3,000km, able to engage 
approximately 100 targets with the fuel stored onboard (on-orbit refueling is also 
foreseen).51 
D.       SUMMARY 
As robust as the overall U.S. TMD effort may appear, it is important to note that 
many of the systems mentioned above are still many years away from being operational. 
Due to the extended research and development cycle, along with sporadic funding levels 
throughout much of the last decade, many of the systems described above will not factor 
into the military and political calculus of the East Asian region until later this decade or 
well into the next decade. With the PAC-2 already widely deployed, only the lower-tier 
PAC-3 and Navy Area Wide systems are poised to achieve Initial Operational Capability 
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(IOC) in the near term. The upper-tier THAAD and NTW systems, as well as the ABL, 
are estimated to be on track to reach IOC by the end of the decade. 
The most pertinent aspect of the current TMD debate regarding East Asia 
revolves around the notion of extending upper-tier systems such as THAAD or NTW to 
U.S. allies in the region. Introducing this new capability, either solely in the hands of the 
U.S. military or in a coalition arrangement, will alter the way security has been provided 
in East Asia for the past several decades. Will this change act as a stabilizing force in the 
region by illuminating the futility of relying on theater missiles as the sole means of 
power projection? Or, will it merely escalate an already spiraling regional arms race? 
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V.      OFFENSE, DEFENSE, OR BOTH? 
A.       "OFFENSE-DEFENSE" THEORY - THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY 
The most troubling consequence of the PRC missile program has been that it 
invited the destabilizing perception that an offensive military mindset has taken hold of 
the civilian and military leadership in Beijing. The provocative build-up in overall 
missile numbers and capabilities suggest that it has embraced a new logic that heavy 
reliance upon theater missiles is the critical factor that will allow China to conquer 
territory quickly and on the relative cheap. 
It is the willingness of the DPRK to sell its ballistic missiles to virtually anyone 
with the means to pay for them that makes the North Korean missile program so 
dangerous. But, the destabilizing influence regarding China's missile program is the 
apparent embrace of the idea within the PRC — an irredentist state with unresolved 
territorial claims or disputes all across its extended periphery — that rapid military action 
(with barrages of ballistic missiles acting as the key component of an operation) can and 
will act as a sufficient resolution to any territorial differences not resolved in Beijing's 
favor. As Steven Van Evera writes: 
When conquest is easy [or perceived to be easy], the incentive to strike 
first is larger because a successful attack provides larger rewards and 
averts greater dangers...Conversely, if the defense dominates, the first- 
move dividend is small because little can be done with any material 
advantage gained by moving first...[And] when conquest is easy, states 
adopt more dangerous diplomatic tactics - specifically, fait accompli 
tactics - and these tactics are more likely to cause war.52 
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War also is far more common when elites believe that the offense dominates, and 
states are far more belligerent when they perceive large defensive vulnerabilities and 
offensive opportunities for themselves.53 
It is quite evident that the overwhelming performance of U.S. conventional forces 
during the Gulf War (against an Iraqi Army that was extensively equipped with Chinese 
made armaments) has brought about a feeling of vulnerability on the part of Chinese 
leaders when assessing the combat potential of the PLA in confrontation with the United 
States. The virtual impunity with which the U.S. military acted during the Kosovo 
conflict in 1999 did nothing to assuage this feeling of military weakness. Furthermore, 
the emphasis now placed upon the acquisition of offensive-oriented weapons systems 
such as theater ballistic missiles, diesel-electric submarines, and long-range fighter/attack 
aircraft with in-flight refueling capability are indicative of a military being tailored to 
take advantage of opportunities for conquest beyond the current borders of the PRC. 
B.        OPERATIONAL CHOICES - THE PURSUIT OF BALANCE 
When trying to conceptualize an effective response to a perplexing problem, it is 
best to focus on what can be done instead of what one would like to do. As the situation 
stands today, the only capability that the U.S. military could bring to bear on the PRC or 
any country with a significant ballistic missile arsenal at its disposal is to conduct 
offensively oriented strike operations against either the missiles themselves or the support 
infrastructure and command and control networks that direct them. The limited point 
defense capability provided by the lower-tier Patriot systems currently in the field or in 




Systems can offer some protection to vital command, control, and communication nodes 
but could be easily overwhelmed in the event of a sustained and determined effort. 
Recent experience in the Gulf War of 1991 provides some insight as to the depth 
of the problem facing U.S. and allied military commanders as they seek to defeat a future 
ballistic missile threat. Once Iraq began using its short-range ballistic missiles against 
targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, coalition forces were forced to divert disproportionate 
numbers of tactical aircraft to "SCUD-hunt" operations in western Iraq in an effort to 
defeat the Iraqi missile threat by destroying the limited number of transporter-erector- 
launchers (TEL's) in the Iraqi arsenal. After thousands of sorties and almost incalculable 
man-hours expended in support of those operations, not a single Iraqi TEL had been 
destroyed and Iraq continued to launch its missiles until the end of the conflict, albeit at a 
reduced rate compared to the start of the war. 
This experience mimics that of the Allied Air Forces in World War II when they 
tried to respond to the German V-l and V-2 threat against Great Britain. Operation 
CROSSBOW took seventy-seven days and 16,566 sorties but did not stop the attacks 
launched upon Great Britain from occupied French territory.54 Only when allied armies 
overran the launch areas did the German campaign come to an end. 
The lesson to be learned is that an offensive posture is not always the appropriate 
response when trying to counter a dangerous threat. A prominent example of this lesson 
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The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in 1917 had 
brought Great Britain to the brink of capitulation. While its vital supply link to the 
United States was being shut off, the British Admiralty sought to defeat the problem by 
going on the offensive and hunting down the problematic German U-boats. As George 
Baer writes, "In the tradition of offensive action, the foe was sought out and, if found, 
visually engaged and destroyed...Hunting the hunters, however, did not solve the 
problem."55 The U-Boats proved to be too elusive and too focused on sinking merchant 
shipping. Engaging British warships was not the mission at hand for German U-Boat 
commanders. 
As shipping losses continued to mount in the spring of 1917, a drastic change was 
in order. To defeat the German strategy and to protect shipping, a better counterstrategy 
was needed. This was found in the venerable practice of convoy, a form of direct and 
strictly defensive sea control.56 Once this approach was adopted, allied shipping losses 
started to decline steadily. While the convoy system did not result in a sharp increase of 
German U-Boat losses, its impact proved decisive in the overall war effort. The true 
measure of effectiveness was the amount of tonnage that reached allied harbors safely, 
not the number of confirmed U-Boat kills recorded. 
A further illustration of this point about offensive and defensive responses lies in 
the divergent experiences of the British and Americans in Southeast Asia in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 




British rule on the Malay peninsula faced a strong and well-organized insurgency 
throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s. Without significant military forces at its 
disposal to deal with the problem, the British relied heavily on non-military solutions, 
combined with small-scale military engagements with guerrilla forces as a 
counterinsurgency strategy. This emphasis on the "hearts and minds" approach, which is 
more operationally defensive in nature, contrasted dramatically with the American 
experience in South Vietnam in the 1960s. 
In South Vietnam, the American military sought to defeat an insurgency primarily 
through superior firepower. The "search and destroy" strategy relied on an essentially 
offensive approach to defeat an enemy that was adept at hiding or dispersing itself away 
from the brunt of U.S. air and artillery bombardment. Escalation of the conflict did not 
solve the problem, either. As Sir Robert Thompson, who served in Malaya throughout 
the emergency as an administrator and later headed the British Advisory Mission to 
South Vietnam stated, "doubling the effort... only squared the error."57 
The fundamental flaw in the U.S. approach to its insurgency problem was that it 
failed to understand the need to moderate its emphasis on coercion in favor of a more 
effective effort at winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese who were 
assisting the insurgents. As Richard Stubbs has written, "These two approaches should 
not be considered as a dichotomy but rather as two poles of a continuum. Any counter- 
guerrilla campaign will contain elements of both strategies although one will usually 
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predominate."58 Finding the right way to blend offensive and defensive measures when 
faced with a specific threat is the key to minimizing the risk that that threat poses to your 
own forces and those of your allies. 
C.        CURRENT U.S. TMD DOCTRINE 
Since Operation Desert Storm, U.S. TMD doctrine has evolved toward an 
approach that is composed of four operational elements which combine the inherent 
advantages of both offensive and defensive measures. They are: passive defense, active 
defense, attack operations, and command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence (C4I).59 
Passive defense measures are measures taken to position military forces and 
critical logistical nodes to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of a missile 
attack through combining such methods as providing tactical warning of an impending 
attack, hardening vulnerable targets, dispersal of forces, and maintaining a recovery and 
reconstitution capability.60 
Active defense measures are the heart and soul of the TMD effort. Here, TMD 
assets are dedicated to the interception in flight of enemy theater ballistic or cruise 
missiles. To accomplish this task, emphasis must be placed on the following 
requirements: 
• The need for the earliest possible warning of TBM preparation and launch. 
• Highly automated coordination of complimentary defensive systems. 
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• A tactical preference for systems that achieve intercept early in the TBM 
trajectory in order to mitigate WMD warhead effects and avoid the need 
for single-target endgame [point] defense; and, 
• Rigorous fire discipline and reliable kill assessment to prevent wasteful 
expenditure of a limited interceptor inventory.61 
Attack operations involve efforts to prevent the launch of TBM's by attacking 
each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch 
platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms, C2 nodes, and 
missile stocks and infrastructure.62 This is the U.S. military's preferred method of 
countering enemy TMD operations. 
The final element of U.S. TMD doctrine ~ C4I — has been described more as a 
"plinth" than a pillar as all the other elements are so heavily dependent upon the 
successful integration of this effort into the overall attempt to field a capable defense 
against ballistic missiles.63 
C4I for the TMD battle encompasses far more than issues of command and 
control. It is indeed and "architecture," a commander's "system of systems." C4I seeks 
to overcome the greatest difficulties of TMD - distance (great) and time (little) - by 
integrating focused intelligence collection, early warning, sensor cueing, defensive 
system response, and assessment of system effectiveness.64 
What is most obvious from this synopsis of U.S. TMD doctrine is that capabilities 
have yet to evolve to a point where they can fulfill the ambitions of U.S. military 
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strategists. Continuing to rely so heavily upon offensive strike elements as the preferred 
method of dealing with a future missile threat is bound to limit the effectiveness of the 
U.S. military response. It also may provoke a crisis by openly relying on an ineffective 
means of deterrence. As Bernard Brodie has written, "There is a rough rule-of-thumb 
principle that no enemy vehicle of attack must be permitted to a have a 'free ride.' The 
enemy should not be relieved of uncertainty with respect to any avenue of attack which it 
is feasible for him to use."65 
Such a compelling and militarily prudent attitude should be the cornerstone of 
U.S. TMD efforts in East Asia. As the following chapter outlines, maintaining the peace 
in this region of the world is essential to U.S. national interests and is going to require a 
concerted effort between the U.S. and its allies if the status quo is to be maintained. 
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VI.    THE STAKES FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES 
For much of the past several decades, Northeast Asia has witnessed a remarkable 
level of political stability and economic prosperity that has been made possible by the 
presence of U.S. military forces in the region. In fact, it has been the preponderance of 
U.S. forward deployed forces in Asia during the Cold War and afterwards that has served 
to mitigate the traditional security dilemma competition that would have normally been 
expected in the absence of such an overwhelming capability. 
As opposed to the experience of Europe since the end of World War II, the Asia- 
Pacific region did not witness the development of a rich network of institutions and 
confidence building measures during the Cold War, and there was no reconciliation 
between China and Japan comparable to that between France and Germany in the context 
of the European Union or NATO.66 Therefore, the presence of the U.S. military has been 
and remains the only reliable means of tempering a regional balance of power rivalry that 
could serve to destabilize the status quo environment and disrupt the efforts of so many 
countries in the region to enjoy a standard of living that has been rising much faster than 
the global average. Even the opening of the PRC by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and 
the emphasis he placed upon economic growth, which has seen the relative prosperity 
level of tens of millions of PRC citizens rise substantially, was based upon the 
assumption that Asia would continue to enjoy the absence of major conflict made 
possible by the continuation of the U.S. military presence. 
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Another factor that makes the basing of U.S. military forces possible in the region 
is that Washington is a distant power with no local territorial claims.67 It also has 
expressed a desire to continue to devote considerable resources in maintaining its force 
posture in the region since the American economy is now more dependent upon trade 
with the growing economies of Asia than with those of Europe. 
Yet the ability of the U.S. military to maintain its dominance in the region is 
being undermined by the growing threat it faces in the form of the prolific development 
of the PRC and DPRK missile programs. The current inability of the United States to 
credibly defend against this threat has had a provocative impact on the formation of 
strategy on the part of these two countries. Not only are U.S. military forces themselves 
now at risk from these long-range strike weapons, but the countries who host the bases 
which support this forward presence are also now open to the potential of coercion that 
could result in them being forced to deny the U.S. military access to their facilities during 
a future crisis. The paragraphs below will discuss in some detail how Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan each view the introduction of TMD into the region and the possible 
ramifications of failing to form a consensus on the issue. 
A.        JAPAN 
The cornerstone of strategic stability in East Asia has been the 1951 U.S.-Japan 
alliance that played such a central role in checking the spread of Soviet power in Asia 
during the Cold War. Though this alliance was one of the major factors that made it 
possible for the Western powers to prevail over the Soviet Union, the problem of 




underlying causes of the muddled and uncertain outlook that jeopardizes future security 
in the region. 
While this alliance remains the pillar not only of Japan's security policy but also 
of the U.S ability to project power into the region, there has been tremendous anxiety as 
to how this relationship will evolve to cope with the altered security situation in the Asia- 
Pacific of the early 21st century. The issue of TMD is at the forefront of the concerns 
currently shaping the debate. 
More than any other event, the unannounced testing of the North Korean 
Taepodong multi-stage ballistic missile in August 1998 brought home to the Japanese 
public just how vulnerable their territory had become to the North Korean and Chinese 
missile threat. This test immediately resulted in an enhanced effort to cooperate with the 
United States on TMD research and development, with the eventual goal in mind of 
constructing an effective TMD system that can adequately provide defensive coverage 
for most of the home islands. Whether or not this coverage will be provided by a sea- 
borne system designed around the U.S. Navy's Area Wide and Theater Wide programs 
(taking advantage of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Aegis-equipped Kongo- 
class destroyers), or the U.S. Army's THAAD program remains to be seen at this point. 
For the U.S. military, this future coverage will be imperative as the heavy 
concentration of forward deployed forces currently based in Japan are the logistical 
linchpin that permits it to conduct sustained operations in Northeast Asia. If those bases 
were to be attacked and made even temporarily inoperable during a crisis, then 
operational paralysis could be imposed upon the U.S. military in such a way that it may 
not be able to respond effectively to a hypothetical challenge in the region. It is just such 
47 
a window of opportunity that North Korean or Chinese strategists may be hoping to attain 
with their missile capability. If they feel that conflict with the United States is inevitable 
for whatever reason, a temporary reprieve from the brunt of the U.S. military may be all 
they feel they need to achieve their objective and present the world with a. fait accompli. 
This scenario appears to rely on the calculation that a reversal of this new situation 
through military action would be deemed too expensive, thus allowing any gains made by 
the PLA or the North Korean army to stand. 
Another aspect regarding Tokyo's interest in TMD has to do with its perception 
of the level of American commitment to its defense as the PRC continues to grow in 
overall economic and military power. In this respect, a strong and unambiguous 
obligation on the part of the United States to extend TMD to cover Japan would be a 
solid and tangible demonstration to this valuable ally that the United States has every 
intention of committing U.S. lives and resources to the defense of Japan, even in the face 
of a volatile and unsettling arms race in the region. 
Furthermore, extension of a U.S. TMD umbrella to Japan would serve to assuage 
Japanese anxiety in facing the nuclear capability of its natural rival in the region, the 
PRC. Without a nuclear capacity of its own to deter the Chinese and absent any clear-cut 
commitment on the part of the United States to act in a way that negates or at least 
minimizes this threat, the Japanese could very well be inclined to pursue the development 
of their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Such an event would only serve to 
further undermine regional stability as many of Japan's neighbors, who experienced the 
grief of Japanese militarism firsthand during World War II, remain fearful that the 
militaristic element of Japanese society has not been eradicated but only suppressed by 
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Article DC of the Japanese Constitution. Most countries in the region even view the role 
of the U.S. military in Japan as providing the added bonus of restraining any effort by the 
Japanese to remilitarize. 
The Chinese, who probably suffered the most atrocities at the hands of Japanese 
invaders, are particularly sensitive to any mention of a Japanese nuclear capability. As an 
illustrative example of this concern, the Chinese have deep suspicions about the huge 
stockpiles of high-grade nuclear fuel that was reprocessed in France and shipped back to 
Japan in the early 1990s. Many in China look upon Japan's acquisition of this plutonium 
as part of a strategy for the eventual development of nuclear weapons, which is 
something they suspect that Japanese scientists would have little difficulty producing.68 
Therefore, if the U.S. security guarantee is the cork in the bottle keeping the genie of 
Japanese militarism from escaping, TMD makes the cork all the stronger.69 
B.        SOUTH KOREA 
For South Korea, the TMD debate is complicated by efforts to reconcile relations 
with North Korea. As Pyongyang's missile program is one of the leading justifications 
for TMD, the decision-makers in Seoul must walk a fine line that balances their desire to 
negotiate a resolution with North Korea through President Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine 
Policy" while at the same time trying to find a way to accommodate the needs of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance, which has served the national interests of South Korea very well over 
the past several decades and remains a cornerstone of South Korean national security 
today. 
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The possibility that South Korea will participate in a co-development effort of 
TMD technology are remote because the opportunity costs of such an expensive 
undertaking are considered too steep for Seoul to shoulder. TMD would do little to 
resolve South Korea's immediate security problem, which is the massive deployment of 
North Korean artillery that is currently arrayed just north of the demilitarized zone and 
that has the range to devastate the South Korean capital within twenty-four hours from 
current positions. The North Korean ballistic missile inventory certainly poses a threat to 
the crucial rear staging areas (i.e. Pusan) that the U.S. and South Korean militaries would 
rely on in the event of a renewed conflict on the peninsula, but it is only one of many 
operational considerations for South Korea that are unique due to their geographic 
proximity to the problem. 
The most likely formula for introducing TMD coverage into South Korea would 
have to do with providing coverage to the U.S. military bases and the approximately 
37,000 American troops currently stationed on Korean soil. The domestic political 
ramifications within the United States for leaving these troops without any degree of 
protection would be disastrous for many elected officials in Washington. The South 
Korean government has been sympathetic in this regard, as evidenced by their allowing 
the introduction of the PAC-2 and soon to be deployed PAC-3 lower-tier TMD systems 
into the country to protect such critical military nodes. In the event of a crisis, it is easily 
imaginable that a sea-based upper tier component such as NTW or the Air Force's ABL 
would be brought in to supplement the lower-tier capability of the Patriot. It is far more 
difficult to envision the deployment of the Army's THAAD system as the permanent 
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presence of a land-based upper tier system is bound to be considered too provocative not 
only to North Korea, but to the PRC as well. 
Perhaps the most complicating aspect of South Korea's efforts to balance its 
policy on TMD revolves around its long-term relationship with its Chinese neighbor. 
Korea's traditional tributary relationship with various Chinese dynasties throughout the 
centuries suggests it is not inconceivable that South Korea, or even a post-reunification 
Korean peninsula, would find itself forced to gravitate or even bandwagon towards a 
more accommodating rapport with the PRC. The level of trade between South Korea 
and the PRC has grown tremendously over the last decade, and this fact, along with the 
geographic contiguity of the Korean peninsula to the Chinese mainland, requires the 
South Korean leadership to be extremely sensitive towards the interests of the PRC. A 
fateful misstep on TMD policy by South Korea could prove to have debilitating 
consequences for its long-range security stance vis-ä-vis China. This especially holds 
true if the nature of the American military posture on the peninsula or the U.S.-ROK 
security alliance undergoes a fundamental alteration in the coming years. 
C.       TAIWAN 
The question of Taiwan and its future lies at the heart of any discussion on 
security issues in East Asia. The intractable nature of this predicament only serves to 
highlight the difficult policy choices surrounding the idea of TMD and its applicability to 
Taiwanese security. 
From the Taiwanese perspective, the daunting specter of hundreds of PLA 
SRBMs deployed within range of the island, along with a myriad of additional weapons 
systems   such  as  fourth-generation  fighter-bombers  and  diesel-electric   submarines, 
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compel it to seek out as many defensive systems available to counter this growing threat 
to its immediate survival. To say that Taipei is enthusiastic about the idea of being 
included into some form of U.S. TMD coverage would be an understatement. 
-■&*■ 
As a matter of U.S. law, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 requires the 
United States to "provide arms of a defensive character" to the island nation. While this 
phrase is open to various interpretations, the PRC and the United States did issue a joint 
communique on August 17, 1982 that announced that the United States had agreed "that 
its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the 
level of those supplied in recent years... and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of 
arms to Taiwan."70 However, this commitment on the part of the United States to slowly 
shut off its arms pipeline to Taiwan was based on the assumption that the PRC would 
continue to emphasize the goal of peaceful reunification with the mainland. As former 
President Reagan stated in a message to Taiwan's then-President Chiang Ching-kuo just 
before the signing of the communique: 
I want to point out...this decision [on the communique with Beijing] is 
based on a PRC decision only to use peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan 
issue. On this point, the U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC 
says, but will also use all methods to achieve surveillance of PRC military 
production and military deployments. If there is any change with regard 
to their commitment to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, the U.S. 
commitments would become invalidated.71 
In light of the burgeoning military threat posed by the PLA and its attempts to 
modernize its force structure to a point where it can credibly attack Taiwan and seize it in 
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the event of the Taiwanese government declaring independence, it is perfectly reasonable 
to assume that the leadership in Beijing has altered its approach to the Taiwan issue over 
the last decade from one that emphasized a peaceful resolution to one that now stresses a 
viable military option as the probable method it will turn to in order to reunify with the 
island. This shift to a more belligerent strategy on the part of Beijing has nullified any 
argument that the United States cannot either sell TMD technology to Taiwan or simply 
deploy its future TMD assets to the vicinity of Taiwan should the PLA attempt a forceful 
coercion of the island. Also, the question of Taiwan's inclusion into a U.S.-led TMD 
umbrella is looked upon as a litmus test for the United States by its key allies in the 
region. Japan, Korea, and even Australia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia are 
watching closely to see if the United States has the strength to manage the rise of China 
and to remain the guarantor of East Asian stability and security.72 
One further aspect of the debate surrounding TMD and Taiwan, but one that is 
rarely mentioned, is the strong inclination that Taiwan has to pursue its own WMD and 
ballistic missile capabilities as a deterrent against Chinese aggression. Taiwan has shown 
an interest in such weapons as far back as the mid-1960s when the PRC first detonated its 
own atomic weapon. Through a series of overt and covert methods, Taiwan sought to 
obtain adequate technology and expertise that would allow it to produce its own nuclear 
device all the way into the 1980s, when the United States was able to apply enough 
pressure on Taipei to stop its efforts.73 Some suggest, however, that Taiwan continued to 
conduct research on nuclear weapons technology at its Chungshan Institute of Science 
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and Technology (CSIST), which serves as its advanced weapons laboratory.74 What 
spurred this effort was the perception in Taipei that the United States was in the process 
of abandoning its commitment to guarantee Taiwan's security as the 1970s was the 
timeframe in which President Nixon's opening towards the PRC, a move intended as a 
counterbalance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, took place. In order to 
normalize relations with the PRC, the United States had to sever official relations with 
Taiwan and end any formal military ties to the island. Until recently, the notion of 
"strategic ambiguity" had remained the underlying principle of U.S. policy towards 
Taiwan and its security needs. 
Though the question of Taiwan's nuclear capability has been muted since the 
1980s, rumors still abound as to whether or not Taiwan is continuing its efforts to 
develop and build ballistic and cruise missiles as a way of gaining the capability to strike 
at targets on the mainland, either in a counterforce or countervalue role, as a means of 
self-protection.75 Further evidence of such a possibility exists in a controversial speech 
delivered by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian at the anniversary of Taiwan's Army 
Academy in June 2000 where he discussed the concept of "offshore engagement."76 
Many analysts believe that this phrase, along with others such as "fighting a decisive 
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battle away from Taiwan's shores," are indeed cryptic references to Taiwan's missile 
program that are directed at the mainland.77 
For the United States and its allies in East Asia, the notion of an unrestrained and 
out of control arms race fostered by an overbearing reliance on offensive weapons 
systems does not bode well for future stability and continuing prosperity. Should the 
United States not choose to impose its considerable military and diplomatic influence as a 
tempering authority over this volatile security environment, it will relinquish any control 
it maintains over the current situation and abandon the region to its own fate, which is 
beginning to share many of the same characteristics of Europe prior to World War I. 
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VII. THE THREAT OF TMD TO THE DPRK AND THE PRC 
A.   TMD AND THE DPRK 
While it is clear that a form of frantic deterrence lies at the heart of the North 
Korean missile program, it is important to state clearly that the style of deterrence this 
strategy resembles is of the "minimal" variety. The number of long-range ballistic 
missiles (i.e. Nodong's and Taepodong's) in Pyongyang's inventory is assessed to be 
small and their warheads are inaccurate to the point that they are not capable of 
performing a counterforce role. Therefore, they are confined to a countervalue mission 
that targets "soft" and immovable targets, such as population centers or large military 
bases. 
The enormous expenditure these weapons represent in the overall North Korean 
economy has meant that Pyongyang is now completely reliant upon these missiles to 
further the perception that they can inflict an unacceptable level of destruction on any of 
its neighbors who may participate in a war against North Korea. Any potential defensive 
system that negates the effectiveness of these missiles will have a devastating impact on 
the mindset of North Korea's leaders and will ultimately force them to alter their 
behavior in one of two ways. 
First, they could choose to enhance efforts to developing their missile technology 
to the point where it can defeat whatever operational TMD system is eventually deployed 
to the region. While accurate economic data on the state of the North Korean economy 
are difficult to obtain, it is reasonable to surmise that the current level of sophistication 
and production of ballistic missiles in North Korea has come at an extreme cost to that 
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society and has only been made possible by the sources of foreign funding that have kept 
the industry afloat. It is not clear that such an effort can be sustained if it became 
necessary to get into a debilitating competition over missile technology, especially 
against some of the most wealthy and advanced industrial economies in the world. Also, 
by spurring efforts by the U.S. and its allies to develop and deploy TMD, North Korea 
has in all likelihood initiated a contest that it cannot hope to win. The lesson learned by 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and one that is probably lurking deep in the minds 
of the North Korean leadership, is that it is impossible to win a military spending contest 
with capitalist societies. 
In addition, there has been and will continue to be enormous pressure placed upon 
North Korea, especially by the PRC, to tone down its missile program. Beijing is 
motivated by its recognition that political forces within the United States and Japan have 
seized upon North Korean missile development and proliferation as an acceptable fig leaf 
of cover to tout the necessity of deploying a TMD capability to the region that, in all 
likelihood, will also be directed at the PRC. 
Finally, North Korea's missile proliferation activities which are a lucrative source 
of convertible revenue for the cash-strapped country, are eventually going to reach a 
threshold where relying on their export for purely economic reasons becomes 
unsustainable. A consensus is growing among many nations that this activity is 
unacceptable and directly threatens their own national interests. In addition, the level of 
resources it takes for most developing countries to acquire missiles serves as an 
impediment to their unlimited procurement. Eventually, the emerging U.S. TMD 
capability will escalate the costs of this competition beyond a sustainable level for many 
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countries. Most governments involved in buying these weapons will be unable to afford 
any additional upgrades or follow-on generations of missiles as they become available. 
TMD will then serve to highlight the futility and wastefulness of the initial decision to 
obtain these weapons as they become obsolete. 
A second possible alteration of policy for North Korea is to accept the fact that it 
is time to become a more integrated actor within the international system and begin to 
accrue some of the benefits that are conferred upon countries that conform, at least to 
some degree, to the norms of international behavior. While that may seem an obvious 
choice to most people on the outside looking into North Korea, such a course of action is 
a dangerous prospect for the Pyongyang regime because it may hasten or at least risk the 
downfall of Kim Jong-Il and his leadership clique by weakening the ultimate and 
unquestioned authority they currently possess. Nevertheless, this danger does not 
preclude the leadership from embarking on such a path as the most acceptable option 
available. Perhaps the prospect of facing an impermeable strength, buttressed by the 
deployment of TMD south of the DMZ and across the Sea of Japan, will ultimately 
provide North Korea with enough incentive to reform itself into a more benign actor on 
the world stage. 
However events unfold in Pyongyang, it will be imperative that the United States 
and its allies shape their policies towards North Korea in the most prudent manner 
possible. Developing a TMD system as a means of coping with a North Korean threat 
will only serve to pressure elements within the North Korean leadership to make a 
difficult choice that results either in something resembling the status quo ad infinitum or 
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something that offers at least the promise of an improvement in physical security and 
living standards. 
B.       TMD AND THE PRC 
The primary concern of Chinese strategists is the possibility that a U.S. NMD 
system could nullify its strategic deterrent, and quite rightly so. Few would argue that the 
PRC does not have the inherent interest in maintaining a survivable nuclear deterrent in a 
world that places a high value on such a capability. In light of this fact, it is not 
surprising nor should it be viewed necessarily as destabilizing for the PRC to engage in a 
build-up and modernization of its strategic nuclear forces into something that could at 
least offer the possibility of a survivable second strike capability. 
Conversely, the notion of TMD and Chinese security exists at a different level and 
takes into account an entirely different set of circumstances. As mentioned previously, 
the PLA is undergoing a perilous shift in deterrence policy from one that emphasizes a 
"minimal" approach at the strategic level to one that accentuates a "limited" role for 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in theater-level conflicts. This is especially 
pertinent due to the fact that China has a significant number of territorial disputes along 
its periphery, any one of which could result in an armed conflict somewhere in the future. 
The potential of combustible irredentist quarrels among states makes reliance on theater 
ballistic missiles, either conventionally armed or tipped with WMD warheads, as a means 
of applying military force to a situation intrinsically risky due to the speed at which these 
weapons travel. The potential for a conflict to escalate out of control in such a case is 
overwhelming. 
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The most relevant factor that has influenced China's thinking about the prospect 
of U.S. TMD in East Asia revolves around Taiwan and the possibility of the island 
formally declaring independence from the mainland. Judging by extensive dialogue in 
the press and diplomatic negotiations, this prospect is totally unacceptable to Beijing and 
would be met with a violent reaction, leading to devastating consequences not only for 
Taiwan, but also to any nation that would help defend the island. 
There are many reasons for such a visceral reaction on the part of the PRC. First, 
the mere existence of a thriving and democratic Taiwan on the verge of declaring its 
formal independence from the mainland poses a deep-seated threat to the preeminence of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within Chinese society. The mere fact that over 22 
million people who share a cultural heritage with the Chinese can create and maintain a 
thriving democracy casts a pall over the accomplishments of the CCP in the past fifty 
years. Coercing Taiwan into reunifying with the mainland would conveniently eliminate 
a democratic alternative to the regime in Beijing.78 Second, since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the discrediting of Communist ideology throughout the world, the CCP 
has been forced to turn to not only the promise of furthering economic gains in China but 
also to an intense level of nationalism as legitimating sources for its rule. Only by 
promising a future of continuing economic prosperity and maintaining a unified nation, 
of which they consider Taiwan a part, will the CCP be able to retain any basis for its 
continuation in power. If the leadership in Beijing ever displays an inability to guarantee 
either of these two pillars of its legitimacy, then it runs the risk of being disgraced in front 
of the Chinese people, with possibly dire consequences as a result. 
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In light of the importance the PRC places on not only preventing Taiwan from 
declaring independence but also eventually forcing it to reunify with the mainland, the 
Chinese are vehemently opposed to any idea that involves U.S. military intervention in a 
future Taiwan Straits crisis. Besides asserting that all weapons sales to Taiwan are a 
violation of Chinese sovereignty, Beijing articulates its opposition to U.S. TMD coverage 
for Taiwan along three lines. First, any introduction of an upper tier TMD system to the 
island would necessitate a close working relationship between the militaries of the United 
States and Taiwan as any such system, in order to be effective, would require the C4I 
assets that only the United States possesses. Such a working relationship would serve to 
act as a de facto military alliance that would resemble the defunct 1954 U.S.-ROC 
alliance that Washington abandoned in 1979 as a price for the normalization of relations 
between the United States and the PRC. 
Second, Chinese strategists believe that any inclusion of Taiwan in a TMD 
umbrella would serve to embolden advocates of independence within Taiwanese society 
who have been muted somewhat by the threat of a military assault in some form by the 
PLA if independence is declared. The Chinese are so concerned by this prospect that 
they even consider such defensive weapon systems as TMD in the hands of Taiwan and 
any of its potential allies to be dangerous and destabilizing.79 The assumption here 
appears to be that by eliminating or at least minimizing the one credible military option 
available against Taiwan, then the prospect of maintaining regional peace will be 
diminished. 
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Finally, Beijing claims that the extension of any capable upper tier TMD system 
will be a firm and unambiguous commitment on the part of the United States towards 
guaranteeing Taiwanese security. While the notion of strategic clarity has been implied if 
not enunciated by U.S. statements and actions (e.g. the deployment of two U.S. aircraft 
carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and the recent 
pronouncement by President Bush that the United States would do "whatever it took" to 
defend Taiwan), the tangible presence of TMD assets in or around Taiwan on a 
continuing basis would underscore the political support that the island maintains to carry 
on the status quo. Even if such a future system could be easily defeated by saturation or 
advancements in decoy technology by the Chinese, its presence would still strengthen the 
resolve of the island's populace if it came under enhanced pressure to reunify. 
For Beijing, the idea that Taiwan will remain outside the fold of Chinese unity for 
the foreseeable future is becoming less and less palatable as the visible shortcomings of 
the PRC become more glaring and more obvious as time moves forward. The issue of 
Taiwan's reunification with the mainland, which was once considered a "fifty-year 
problem" by Deng Xiaoping as late as the 1980s, is now a far more pressing concern for 
the members of the Politburo as they grapple with the complexity of governing such a 
large country while their ruling mandate dissipates with each passing year. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
While the overall debate surrounding TMD in Northeast Asia will continue 
unabated in the near term, it is important to remember that the threat these defensive 
systems are designed to counter has evolved in a context of provocatively limited military 
capabilities of the United States and its allies in the region. The lack of an effective 
response to the growing inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles in Northeast Asia has 
only encouraged their preeminence in the minds of strategic planners in Beijing and 
Pyongyang. 
While it is plausible to assume that a future deployment of TMD systems to the 
region will spark an intense and negative response from Beijing and Pyongyang, the 
consequences of failing to deploy such a capability as part of a prudent approach to 
regional stability should dominate the concerns of decision-makers in Washington, 
Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei. Such a failure to act could be interpreted as a tacit acceptance 
of the possession of theater ballistic and cruise missile arsenals by regional powers and of 
the danger they pose to states without a retaliatory capability.80 Encouraging such 
behavior by failing to respond to it is an alarming and reckless breach in the fundamental 
security approach that has kept the peace in the region for the past several decades. 
Ultimately, the question that merits asking in this debate is not how will the 
security environment in Northeast Asia be affected if the United States introduces TMD 
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to the region, but rather how will the security environment be affected if the United States 
does not introduce this capability? 
As it currently stands, U.S. and allied decision-makers and military commanders 
have few options in the region when it comes to facing down such a pervasive threat. 
This lack of a viable alternative diminishes the ability of any future U.S./allied coalition 
to successfully manage a crisis by inhibiting its ability to inject uncertainty into the 
decision-making cycle of planners in either Beijing or Pyongyang. By encouraging 
reluctance when it comes to using the missile option, as any capable TMD system is sure 
to do, then the possibility exists that an escalation of a future crisis into a military 
confrontation could be avoided. 
Finally, the most contentious issue in the region regarding the TMD debate has to 
do with the very nature of the China-Taiwan problem. By offering TMD coverage to 
Taiwan, the United States will be sending the appropriate message to the PRC that 
forceful resolution of this difficult impasse cannot be tolerated. Furthermore, since the 
problem of Taiwan for the Chinese is essentially borne out of the endemic nationalism 
now percolating in Chinese society, then in all likelihood a successful attempt to coerce 
Taipei back into the fold of the PRC will only signal the beginning of a series of such 
efforts to resolve the remaining territorial disputes along its periphery that could be used 
to feed nationalistic appetites within the PRC. Only by choosing to openly delineate a 
threshold of tolerance for what is acceptable and unacceptable when it comes to Taiwan 
will the United States retain any hope of preventing future confrontations over disputes 
such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the disposition of the Senkaku 
islands, and even the unresolved border problem between China and India. 
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Extending TMD to Taiwan will ultimately force the CCP leadership in Beijing to 
choose between the two pillars of its legitimacy - the guarantee of future economic 
growth and the agenda nationalism. It is becoming hard to see how both of these goals 
can be met in a peaceful environment. The political impact of TMD could be just enough 
to give a stronger voice to the more moderate elements within the PRC who favor the 
continuation of economic growth and modernization over those who prefer antagonistic 
military competitions as a way of legitimizing the continuation of CCP rule. Only by 
grasping this opportunity to demonstrate to China the futility of choosing the military 
approach will the United States maintain any expectation that peace and stability will 
continue to be the defining characteristics of this prosperous and vibrant region. 
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